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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
MALICIOUS PROCUREMENT OF *BREACH OF CONTRACT
It is the intent of this note, first, to trace the development of the tort of
inducing breach of contract in England and America, in general, and in Pennsyl-
vania, in particular; second, to set forth the requirements which are necessary to
sustain a cause of action; third, to list the possible remedies available to the plain-
tiff.
The remedy against one who induced breach of contract was first recog-
nized in the now famous case of Lumley v. Gye.1 Miss Wagner, under contract
to sing in Lumley's theatre, was induced by the defendant to breach her contract.
It was shown that the defendant had procured this breach with a malicious intent
to injure the plaintiff: A divided court held that the action could be sustained
and found the defendant guilty of a tort in persuading Miss Wagner to breach
her contract with the plaintiff. This revolutionary extension of the law was at
first received by the ultra-conservative courts of England with great hesitancy;2 but
twenty-eight years later, in Bowen v. Halls the doctrine was restated. Both of
these cases, however, limited recovery to cases involving contracts for personal
services, and it was not until the case of Temperton v. Russell,4 in 1893, that the
principle was extended to include contracts other than those for personal services.
From these embryonic cases the doctrine developed gradually to include practic-
ally any contract. 5
In America, the development was very similar to that in England-reluctance,
at first, followed by almost general approval. A few jurisdictions have refused
to extend the principle beyond the scope of contracts for personal services. 6 It is
submitted that, because of the celerity with which this phase of the law has
developed, even these states will recognize the principle in the broad view in
which it is now almost universally accepted.
The cases in Pennsylvania are typical of the development elsewhere. The
first case in Pennsylvania predicated on the theory was Benford v. Samner,7 de-
cided in 1861. While recovery was denied, the principle was recognized. In this
case it was held that a creditor who knowingly received money which his debtor
had promised to another creditor was not liable for inducing the debtor to breach
his agreement with the other creditor. In discussing the agreement between the
defendant creditor and the debtor, the court, speaking through Justice Strong,
said (at page 18):
12 El. & BI. 216 (1853).
2
Pollock, Law of Torts, 8th edition, page 328; 2 H. L. R. (1888) 19.
86 Q. B. D. 333 (1881).
41 Q. B. 715 (1893).
5
Jasperson v. Dominion Tobacco Co., 92 L. J. P. C. 190 (1923).6
KIine v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902) ; Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 SE
619 (1909); Boulier Brothers v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 SW 60 (1891); Glencoe Land &
Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission Company, 138 Mo. 439, 40 SW 93 (1897).
740 Pa. 9 (1861).
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"Yet a combination with the other defendants for such a purpose was
not illegal, unless it was in fraud of the rights of Samner, and C.
Benford was not responsible at all unless the confederacy was to deprive
the plaintiff of his property."
In Norcross v. Otis Bros. and Company,8 in 1893, it was held that the mere
giving of a notice by a third person to a debtor not to pay his creditor a sum of
money due him under a contract was not sufficient to maintai an action for
damages to recover the loss which the plaintiff had sustained as a result of his
having to bring a suit against the debtor to recover the amount due under the
contract. The court thus held, even though it was shown that the notice had
been given maliciously and vexatiously. These two cases show that while the
Pennsylvania courts recognized the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, they were reluctant
to permit any extension. Did not the defendant in the Norcross case by giving
the notice with full knowledge of the existing contract maliciously procure the
debtor to breach his contract to the injury of the plaintiff?
In Sweeney v. Smith9 , a Pennsylvania federal court case decided in 1909, the
defendant purchased bonds from the Bay Shore Terminal Company, a Virginia
corporation, through a committee which had been vested with plenary power to
act. Defendant had knowledge of a prior agreement of sale which the committee
had made with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought recovery in equity from the
defendant on the theory that the defendant had induced the committee to break
its contract with the plaintiff. The defendant demurred to the bill. The court in
sustaining the demurrer held that the mere knowledge of the plaintiff's contract
with the committee was not sufficient to render the defendant liable. Judge Mc-
Pherson said (at page 387):
"Before he [defendant] can be called to account, some legal ground
of liability must appear; he must participate in the breach before he can
be held to blame; and the mere knowledge that the promisor intends to
break the contract with the first promisee is not wrongful in itself, and
does not disable the second promisee from making the subsequent
contract. To be blameworthy he must take some active step to bring
about the breach. At the least, he must induce or persuade the promisor
to abandon an earlier agreement ...
In Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company'0 (1936), the plaintiff
had a contract of employment with the International Railway Company on which
services had been performed. The defendant fraudulently conspired with the
plaintiff's employer (it represented to the employer that the defendant and not
the plaintiff was entitled to the compensation for the services) to deny the plain-
8152 Pa. 481 (1893).
9167 Fed. 385, Aff'd. 171 Fed. 645, 96 CCA 91, Certiorari denied, 30 SC 400, 215 US 600
(1909).
10321 Pa. 157 (1936).
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tiff's claim. The employer paid the defendant the amount of $40,000 for services
rendered. In sustaining the plaintiff's claim, the court quoted from Temperton v.
Russell" as follows (at page 159):
"A contract confers certain rights on the person with whom it is made,
and not only binds the parties to it by the obligation entered into, but
also imposes on all the world the duty of respecting that obligation."
The court also quoted with approval the statement of Justice Brewer in Angle v.
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Company12 :
"It has been repeatedly held that, if one maliciously interferes in a
contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that
contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain an
action against the wrongdoer."
In Klauder v. Cregar, et al. 3 (1937), the court held that an insurance com-
pany who, through its agent, had maliciously induced a widow to break her con-
tract with the plaintiff (in which contract the plaintiff had been given a power of
attorney to prosecute the claim of the widow against the defendant) was liable.
The court quoting from Hornstein v. Podwitz14 said (at page 8):
"One who, having knowledge of an existing valid contract between
others, intentionally, knowingly, and without reasonable justification or
excuse [italics added], induces one of the parties to the contract to
breach it to the damage of the other party, is liable in an action to recover
the damages suffered. The action is predicated on the intentional inter-
ference without justification with contractual rights, with knowledge
thereof. Such interference constitutes a legal wrong, and, if damages
result therefrom, a valid cause of action exists."
In Wahl v. Strous15 (1942), a case very similar in facts to the Klauder case,
an opposite result was reached. The court distinguished the cases as follows (at
page 406):
"Inasmuch as defendant company, unlike the insurance company in
the Klauder case, did not advise his clients not to pay him, nor represent
that they would be under no obligation to do so if they themselves
effected a settlement, no breach of the plaintiff's contract was induced by
the company... "
In Dorrington et al. v. Manning et al.,16 decided in 1939, there was a very
significant application of the principle. In this case the plaintiffs had been
employees of a bus company and were refused membership in the defendants'
union which had organized all of the bus operators. The defendants threatened
111 Q. B. 715 (1893).
12151 US 1 (1893), at page 13.
13327 Pa. 1 (1937).
14254 NY 443, 173 NE 674 (1930).
16344 Pa. 402 (1942).
16135 Pa. Super. 194 (1939).
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the bus company officials with a strike if they did not discharge the plaintiffs.
The bus company, thus coerced, discharged the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought
suit against the union on the theory that it had maliciously induced the bus offi-
cials to discharge them. The court sustained the plaintiff's argument. Said
Justice Baldridge (at page 200):
.... the defendants' conduct in coercing the employer to discharge the
plaintiffs, who were arbitrarily refused admission to the association.
constituted a malicious and wilful [italics added] interference with the
plaintiffs' contract of employment and a conspiracy to do an unlawful
act."
This was the first case in Pennsylvania which extended this doctrine to include
breaches of contracts caused by inducements from labor unions. In view of the
many present labor difficulties it is very possible that more cases of this kind may
result. Another interesting thing noted in this case is the form of relief which
the court granted. The plaintiffs brought a bill in equity praying that the defen-
dants be enjoined from further interference with their contracts and also asked
damages which had resulted from past interference. The court granted both. This
was the first case in which the court granted an injunction restraining a defendant
from malicious interference with contracted rights. The court in granting the in-
junctive relief, however, placed emphasis on the nature of the contract rather than
on the fact of the malicious interference. It was said (at page 201), "The right
to work . . . constitutes a property right, the continued interference with which
equity will enjoin where the legal remedy is inadequate." Would the court
enjoin malicious interference with any contract?
Eddyside Company v. Seibel et al.1" (1940) is another case brought against
a labor union. In this case the employer sought damages, in trespass, for losses
sustained by him as a result of the defendant's maliciously inducing the employees
to breach their contract of employment. Recovery was allowed. The court (at
page 181) quoted approvingly from Sorenson v. Chevrolet Mototi CompanylS:
"When one has knowledge .of the contract rights of another, his wrong-
ful inducement of a breach thereof is a wilful destruction of the prop-
erty of another... "
The latest case in Pennsylvania on inducing breach of contract is that of
Ramondo et Ux v. Pure Oil Company19 , decided in 1946. Plaintiffs, husband
and wife, leased a gasoline station to the defendant. The latter appointed the
husband to operate the station as its agent. Some time later, while the lease
with the defendant was still effective, the plaintiffs leased the station to X (this
lease was, in effect, an assignment of the husband's agency with the defendant).
The defendant later renewed its lease with the plaintiffs but at the time of such
17142 Pa. Super. 174 (1940).
18171 Minn. 260, 214 NW 754 (1927).
19159 Pa. Super. 217 (1946).
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renewal had full knowledge of the plaintiffs' lease with X. Subsequently, the
defendant induced X to break his lease with the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought
an action to recover the loss sustained as a result of this breach. The court allowed
recovery and cited approvingly the leading Pennsylvania cases mentioned above.
In applying this principle of tort law, there are three important considera-
tions:
A. What are the requisites which must be satisfied to maintain the action?
B. What type of contract does the doctrine contemplate?
C. What are the remedies available to the plaintiff?
A. What are the requisites which must be satisfied to maintain the action?
To maintain the action the plaintiff must show:
1. That there was a contract;
2. That the contract was breached and resulted in injury to him;
3. That the defendant induced and procured the breach
a. knowingly,
b. maliciously,
c. without reasonable cause or justification.
The problems here are two: (1) What is meant by malicious? (2) What is a
reasonable cause or justification? Legal malice, as here used, does not mean actual
malice or ill will. A New York case, Campbell v. Gates,2 ° cited approvingly in
practically all of the Pennsylvania cases, gives a very adequate definition of malice,
as here used:
"Maliciousness does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill will but
the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justifica-
tion."
As to what is legal justification there is no fixed, definite rule to follow. In almost
every case the question to be answered is: Is the actor's conduct justified by the
circumstances? In determining the problem of justification, the following consid-
erations from the Restatement of Torts, Section 767, should prove very helpful:
1. The nature of the actor's conduct;
2. The nature of the expectancy with which his conduct interferes;
3. The relations between the parties;
4. The interest sought to be advanced by the actor;
20236 NY 457, 141 NE 914 (1923).
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5. The social interest in protecting the expectancy on the one hand
and the actor's freedom of action on the other hand.
B. What type of contract does the doctrine contemplate?
As observed in the cases cited above, the scope of the doctrine was limited in
the beginning, but has expanded quite rapidly until it may now be announced that
it applies to any contract which is in force and effect and which is not completely
void as being in restraint of trade or opposed to public policy. It even has been
held applicable to voidable contracts. In Cumberland Glass Company v. DeWitl2
it was held that the fact that a contract was not enforceable because violative of
the statute of frauds was no defense to an action for tortious interference causing
a breach of said contract. In Aalfco Company, Incorporated v. Kinney, et al,1
2
it was held that the mere fact that a contract was unenforceable because of uncer-
tainty was not sufficient to bar an action for maliciously inducing a breach of it.
In Moran v. Dunphy,28 Chief Justice Holmes (at page 487) made it clear that a
contract unenforceable because of lack of mutuality could give rise to an action
for inducing breach thereof, when he said:
"We apprehend that there is no longer any difficulty in recognizing that
a right to be protected from malicious interference may be incident to
a right arising out of a contract, although a contract, so far as performance
is concerned, imposes a duty only on the promisor."
C. What are the remedies available to the plaintiff?
There are two definite remedies available to the plaintiff, and there are two
other possible remedies. The definite remedies are: (1) Trespass for damages;
(2) Assumpsit for money had and received-this was the action used by the plain-
tiff in the Caskie case cited above. The other possible remedies are: (3) Injunc-
tion, as was allowed the plaintiff in the Dorrington case; (4) Bill in Equity
to recover the benefits received by the defendant on the theory that he is a trustee
ex maleficio.24 When the plaintiff seeks to use the equity remedies he must,
of course, show that the legal remedy is inadequate and that a property right is
being violated. The most usual remedy is the action of Trespass.
Inducing breach of contract has had a remarkable growth in less than a cen-
tury. It is submitted that the expansion will continue and will extend to other
phases of breach of contract, for example, negligent breach of contract, 25 and will
even be extended to include cases where there is no contract but where there is a
malicious inducement of another to refuse to contract.
6
BERNARD J. BROWN
21120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927 (1913).
22105 N. J. L. 345, 144 A. 715 (1929).
23177 Mass. 485, 59 NE 125 (1901).
24This remedy is set forth in the dicta in Caskie vs. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, 321
Pa. 157 (1936).
2 5For an interesting article on negligent breach of contract.see 45 Dick. LR (1941) 211.2 6 For a discussion of this extension see 88 Univ. of Pa. LR (1940) 754.
